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ABSTRACT
Cryptographic API misuses, such as exposed secrets, predictable
random numbers, and vulnerable certificate verification, seriously
threaten software security. The vision of automatically screening
cryptographic API calls in massive-sized (e.g., millions of LoC) Java
programs is not new. However, hindered by the practical difficulty
of reducing false positives without compromising analysis quality,
this goal has not been accomplished. State-of-the-art crypto API
screening solutions are not designed to operate on a large scale.
Our technical innovation is a set of fast and highly accurate slic-
ing algorithms. Our algorithms refine program slices by identifying
language-specific irrelevant elements. The refinements reduce false
alerts by 76% to 80% in our experiments. Running our tool, CRYP-
TOGUARD, on 46 high-impact large-scale Apache projects and 6,181
Android apps generate many security insights. Our findings helped
multiple popular Apache projects to harden their code, including
Spark, Ranger, and Ofbiz. We also have made substantial progress
towards the science of analysis in this space, including: i) manually
analyzing 1,295 Apache alerts and confirming 1,277 true positives
(98.61% precision), ii) creating a benchmark with 38-unit basic cases
and 74-unit advanced cases, iii) performing an in-depth comparison
with leading solutions including CrySL, SpotBugs, and Coverity. We
are in the process of integrating CRYPTOGUARD with the Software
Assurance Marketplace (SWAMP).
KEYWORDS
accuracy, cryptographic API misuses, static program analysis, false
positive, benchmark
1 INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic algorithms offer provable security guarantees in the
presence of adversaries. However, vulnerabilities and deficiencies
in low-level cryptographic implementations seriously reduce the
guarantees in practice [15, 24, 27, 35, 36]. Researchers also found
misusing cryptographic APIs is not unusual in application-level
code [31]. Causes of these vulnerabilities are multi-fold, which in-
clude complex APIs [12, 55], the lack of cybersecurity training [52],
the lack of tools [14], and insecure and misleading forum posts
(such as on StackOverflow) [13, 52]. Some aspects of security li-
braries (such as JCA, JCE, and JSSE1) are difficult for developers
1JCA, JCE, and JSSE stand for Java Cryptography Architecture, Java Cryptography
Extension, and Java Secure Socket Extension, respectively.
to use correctly, e.g., certificate verification [37] and cross-language
encryption and decryption [52].
In this work, we focus on the goal of screening massive-sized
Java projects for cryptographic API misuses. Specifically, we aim to
design a static analysis tool that has no or few false positives (i.e.,
false alarms) and can be routinely used by developers.
Efforts to screen cryptographic APIs have been previously re-
ported in the literature, including static analysis (e.g., CrySL [44],
FixDroid [57], CogniCrypt [43], CryptoLint [31]) and dynamic anal-
ysis (e.g., SMV-Hunter [65], and AndroSSL [34]), as well as manual
code inspection [37]. Static and dynamic analyses have their respec-
tive pros and cons. Static methods do not require the execution of
programs. They scale up to a large number of programs, cover a wide
range of security rules, and are unlikely to have false negatives (i.e.,
missed detections). Dynamic methods, in comparison, require one
to trigger and detect specific misuse symptoms at runtime (e.g., mis-
configurations of SSL/TLS). The advantage of dynamic approaches
is that they tend to produce fewer false positives (i.e., false alarms)
than static analysis. Deployment-grade code screening tools need
to be scalable with wide coverage. Thus, static program analysis
approach is favorable. However, existing static analysis-based tools
(e.g., [31, 43, 44, 57]) are not optimized to operate on the scale
of massive-sized Java projects (e.g., millions of LoC), which we
explain later.
Existing static analysis tools are also limited in detecting SS-
L/TLS API misuses and are not designed to detect complex
misuse scenarios. For example, MalloDroid [33] uses a list of
known insecure implementations of HostnameVerifier and
TrustManager to screen apps. Google Play recently deployed
an automatic app checking mechanism for SSL/TLS hostname
verifier and certificate verification vulnerabilities [11]. However,
the inspection appears to only target obvious misuse scenarios,
e.g., return true in verify method or an empty body in
checkServerTrusted [4].
We made substantial progress toward building a high accuracy
and low runtime static analysis solution for detecting cryptographic
and SSL/TLS API misuse vulnerabilities. Our tool,CRYPTOGUARD,
is built on specialized forward and backward program slicing tech-
niques. These slicing algorithms are implemented by using flow-,
context- and field-sensitive data-flow analysis.
Although program slicing is a well-known technique for identi-
fying the set of instructions that influence or are influenced by a
program variable, its direct application to screening cryptographic
implementations has several problems, which are explained next.
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Detection accuracy. A challenging problem that has not been
solved by prior work is the excessive number of false positives that
basic static analysis (including slicing) generates. Several types of
detection require one to search for constants or values from pre-
dictable APIs, e.g., passwords, seeds, or initialization vectors (IVs).
However, benign constants or irrelevant parameters may be mis-
taken as violations (e.g., array/collection bookkeeping constants).
Another source of detection inaccuracy comes from the assump-
tion that all the system and runtime libraries are present during the
analysis. This assumption holds for Android apps (e.g., CrySL [44],
CryptoLint [31]), but not necessarily for Java projects.
A feature of our solution CRYPTOGUARD is a set of refinement
algorithms that systematically discard false alerts. These refinement
insights are derived from empirical observations of common pro-
gramming idioms and language restrictions to remove irrelevant
resource identifiers, arguments about states of operations, constants
on infeasible paths, and bookkeeping values. For eight of our rules,
these refinement algorithms reduce the total number of alerts by
76% in Apache and 80% in Android (Figure 3). Our manual analysis
shows that CRYPTOGUARD has a precision of 98.61% on Apache.
Runtime overhead and coverage. Existing flow-, context- and
field-sensitive analysis techniques build a super control-flow graph
of the entire program, which has a significant impact on runtime. In
contrast, our on-demand slicing algorithms run much faster, which
start from the slicing criteria and only propagate to the methods
that have the potential to impact security. Hence, a large portion of
the code base is not touched. For the Apache projects we evaluated,
CRYPTOGUARD took around 3.3 minutes on average.
More importantly, our lightweight analysis building blocks enable
us to address complex API misuse scenarios. CRYPTOGUARD covers
more cryptographic properties than CrySL [44], Coverity [1], and
SpotBugs [2] combined. Our most complex analysis (for Rule 15 on
insecure RSA/ECC key sizes) involves multiple rounds of forward
and backward slicing.
Our technical contributions are summarized as follows.
• We designed and implemented a set of new analysis algorithms
for detecting cryptographic and SSL/TLS API misuses. Our
static code checking tool, CRYPTOGUARD, is designed for
developers to use routinely on large Java projects. Besides
open-sourcing CRYPTOGUARD2, we are currently integrating
it with the Software Assurance Marketplace (SWAMP) [30], a
well-known free software security analysis platform.
• We gained numerous security insights from screening 46
Apache projects. For 15 of our rules, we observed violations
in Apache projects (Table 6). 39 out of the 46 projects have at
least one type of cryptographic misuses, and 33 projects have
at least two. We reported our security findings to Apache, some
of which have been promptly fixed. In Section 7, we share our
experience of interacting with Apache teams and their prag-
matic constraints e.g., backward compatibility, operation in
humanless settings.
• Our evaluation on 6,181 Android apps shows that around 95%
of the total vulnerabilities come from libraries that are pack-
aged with the application code. Some libraries are from Google,
2Available at https://github.com/CryptoGuardOSS/cryptoguard under GPL v3.0.
Facebook, Apache, Umeng, and Tencent (Table 5). We ob-
serve violations in most of the categories, including hardcoded
keyStore passwords, e.g., notasecret is used in multiple
Google libraries (Table 4). We also detected multiple SSL/TLS
(MitM) vulnerabilities that Google Play’s automatic screening
seemed to have missed.
• We created a benchmark named CRYPTOAPI-BENCH with
112 unit test cases.3 CRYPTOAPI-BENCH contains basic intra-
procedural instances, inter-procedural cases, field sensitive
cases, false positive tests, and correct API uses. Our evalu-
ation on CRYPTOAPI-BENCH shows that CRYPTOGUARD
achieves higher precision and recall than Coverity, SpotBugs
and CrySL [44], which is the state-of-the-art research solu-
tion. The benchmark also reveals false negatives that CRYPTO-
GUARD needs to improve on in the future.
Our key technical novelty and significance are summarized as
follows. [Formulation of problems] We present the mappings be-
tween a number of cryptographic abstractions to concrete Java pro-
gramming elements that can be statically enforced. The mapping
strategy (including specific slicing criteria) is useful beyond CRYP-
TOGUARD (in Section 3). [Methodology development] We special-
ize program slicing with new language-based contextual refinement
algorithms and successfully show a significant reduction of false
alarms (related to constants and predictable values). It is a substantial
advancement over general-purpose slicing and state-of-the-art so-
lutions (in Section 5). [New security capabilities] Our lightweight
algorithm design enables CRYPTOGUARD to check more rules than
existing solutions, while maintaining high precision. [New security
findings] CRYPTOGUARD enables us to report a number of alarm-
ing cryptographic coding issues in open source Apache projects
and Android (in Sections 6.1 and 6.2). [Science of security] Our
CRYPTOAPI-BENCH will motivate researchers to improve the ac-
curacy, coverage, scalability, and transparency of their tools, collec-
tively advancing the science of security (in Section 6.3).
2 THREAT MODEL, CHALLENGES, AND
OVERVIEW
We describe our threat model and discuss the technical challenges
associated with detecting these threats with static program analysis.
For each challenge, we briefly overview our solution.
2.1 Threat Model
We summarize the vulnerabilities that CRYPTOGUARD aims to de-
tect below and in Table 1. We also rank their severity.
1. Vulnerabilities due to predictable secrets. Software with pre-
dictable cryptographic keys and passwords are inherently inse-
cure [31]. Here, we consider the use of any constants, as well as
values that are derived from constants or API calls with predictable
outputs (e.g., DeviceID, Timestamps) to be insecure.
2. Vulnerabilities from MitM attacks on SSL/TLS. Improper cus-
tomization of Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE) APIs may re-
sult in man-in-the-middle (MitM) vulnerabilities [33, 37]. Cryp-
toLint [31] does not detect these vulnerabilities.
3Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/CryptoGuardOSS/cryptoapi-bench.
CRYPTOGUARD: High Precision Detection of Cryptographic Vulnerabilities in Massive-sized Java Projects
1class PasswordEncryptor {
2
3 Crypto crypto;
4
5 public PasswordEncryptor(){
6 String passKey = PasswordEncryptor
.getKey("pass.key");
7 crypto = new Crypto(passKey); p
8 }
9
10 byte[] encPass(String [] arg){
11 return crypto.encrypt(arg[0], arg[1]); p
12 }
13
14 static String getKey(String src){
15 String key = Context.getProperty(src);
16 if (key == null) {
17 key = "defaultkey";
18 }
19 return key;
20 }
21}
22class Crypto {
23
24 String ALGO = "AES";
25 String ALGO_SPEC = "AES/CBC/NoPadding";
26 String defaultKey;
27 Cipher cipher;
28
29 public Crypto(String defKey){
30 cipher = Cipher.getInstance(ALGO_SPEC);
31 defaultKey = defKey; // assigning field
32 }
33
34 byte[] encrypt(String txt,String key){
35 if (key == null){
36 key = defaultKey; f
37 }
38 byte[] keyBytes = key.getBytes("UTF-8");
39 byte[] txtBytes = txt.getBytes();
40 SecretKeySpec keySpc =
new SecretKeySpec(keyBytes, ALGO);
41 cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE,keySpc);
42 return cipher.doFinal(txtBytes);}}
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Figure 1: (a) An example demonstrating various features of CRYPTOGUARD. Crypto class is used for generic AES encryption and
PasswordEncryptor class uses Crypto for password encryption. f indicates influence through the fields and p indicates
influence through the method parameters. (b) Partial data dependency graph for keyBytes variable.
3. Vulnerabilities from predictable PRNGs. The predictabil-
ity of pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) has been
a major source of vulnerabilities [19, 38, 39]. The use of
java.util.Random as a PRNG is insecure [6, 42]. In addition,
seeds for java.security.SecureRandom [7] should not be
predictable.
4. Vulnerabilities from CPA. Ciphertexts should be indistinguish-
able under chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) [31]. Static salts make
dictionary attacks easier on password-based encryption (PBE). In
addition, static initialization vectors (IVs) in cipher block chaining
(CBC) and electronic codebook (ECB) modes are insecure [18, 46].
5. Vulnerabilities from feasible bruteforce attacks. MD5 and SHA1
are susceptible to hash collision [66, 67] and pre-image [8, 26] at-
tacks. In addition, bruteforce attacks are feasible for 64-bit sym-
metric ciphers (e.g., DES, 3DES, IDEA, Blowfish) [20]. 1024-bit
RSA/DSA/DH and 160-bit ECC are also weak [3]. RFC 8018 rec-
ommends at least 1000 iterations for PBE [53].
How severe are these vulnerabilities? Each case has specific attack
scenarios documented in the literature. To prioritize alerts, we catego-
rize their severity into high, medium, and low, based on i) attacker’s
gain and ii) attack difficulty. Vulnerabilities from predictable secrets
and SSL/TLS MitM are immediately exploitable and substantially
benefit attackers. In Android, an application can only access its own
KeyStore. Hence, hard-coded passwords are less harmful in An-
droid. However, privilege escalation attacks bypass this restriction,
which has been demonstrated [69]. Commercially available rain-
bow tables allow attackers to easily obtain pre-images of MD5 and
SHA1 hashes for typical passwords [9]. Hash collisions for these
algorithms enable attackers to forge digital signatures or break the
integrity of any messages [21, 66]. Therefore, these vulnerabilities
are classified as high risks. Vulnerabilities from predictability and
CPA provide substantial advantages to attackers by significantly
reducing attack efforts. They are medium-level risks. Brute-forcing
ciphers, requiring non-trivial effort, is low risk.
2.2 Technical Challenges and Solution Overview
The task of screening millions of lines of code for cryptographic
API misuses poses a set of technical challenges.
Technical Challenge I: False positives.
1. False positives due to phantom methods. A method is phantom if
its body is not available during analysis. Unlike Android, Java web
applications have phantom libraries. A non-system library that is
not packaged with the project binaries is referred to as a phantom
library. Existing cryptographic misuse vulnerability solutions (e.g.,
CryptoLint [31], CrySL [44]) are not designed to handle phantom
libraries, which may cause false positives. For example, in Fig-
ure 1(a) if the class Context is a member of a phantom library,
then getProperty method (Line 15) is a phantom method. The
data-flow diagram in Figure 1(b) shows that a straightforward def-
use analysis would likely report pass.key as a hard-coded key,
since it cannot explore getProperty method at Line 15.
Our solution is a set of new algorithms to refine slicing out-
puts (Section 5). For example, examining the context reveals that
pass.key is used as an identifier of a key and has no security
influence on keyBytes. Thus, it can be safely discarded.
2. False positives due to data structures. Constants for bookkeep-
ing data structures are another major source of false positives that
are largely uncovered in the existing literature (e.g., [31, 44]). Most
frequently used data structures include lists, maps, and arrays. For ex-
ample, a data-structure-unaware analysis would likely report 1 from
Line 11 (Figure 1(a)) as a hard-coded key, as it influences the key
, ,
parameter of encrypt method (Figure 1(b)). Our refinement algo-
rithms track and discard any kinds of data-structure-bookkeeping
constants (Section 5).
Technical Challenge II: precision vs. runtime tradeoff. For a project
with millions LoC (e.g., Apache Hadoop has 2.5 million LoC),
building a super-CFG is costly and unnecessary. Cryptographic
functionality is often confined within a small fraction of the project.
However, most flow-, context- and field-sensitive analysis based
tools (e.g., [31, 44]) appear to build a super control-flow graph, e.g.,
by superimposing the project’s call graph over control-flow graphs
of methods, adding call edges between invoke instructions, method
entries, and exits.
In contrast, we adopt the following more scalable approaches.
1. Demand-driven analysis. Our flow- and context- sensitive analy-
sis is demand driven. Initially, it only creates a call graph. During
the analysis, it performs on-demand inter-procedural backward data
flow analysis to perform backward slicing where the analysis starts
from the slicing criteria and propagates upward and orthogonally on-
demand. For example, in Figure 1(a), a propagation from encrypt
method to encPass method, is an upward propagation. A propaga-
tion to orthogonal method invocations at Line 6 and 38 are orthogo-
nal propagation. Our field sensitivity is also demand driven. Field
sensitivity is applied to a field if the field is directly or indirectly
used in our inter-procedural backward slices. A field’s influence is
considered indirect if the field is accessed using orthogonal method
invocations (i.e., getter methods). We refer to this field sensitivity as
data-only class field-sensitivity.
2. Control the depth of orthogonal explorations. Most of our crypto-
graphic vulnerabilities involve finding constants. A distinguishing
feature of constants is that they require no or few processing before
use. Generally, processing is done by orthogonal method invocations.
Thus, we explore the trade-off between the depth of orthogonal ex-
plorations and the runtime/accuracy of the analysis, by clipping
orthogonal explorations up to a predetermined level with a low
likelihood of causing false negatives. (We set the depth to 1 in our
experiments.) We then use similar techniques as in phantom methods
handling to reduce the false positives introduced by clipping.
3. Subproject awareness. Code in large Java projects is usually orga-
nized into reusable subprojects, packaged as separate .jars. One
may create a fat jar by including all subprojects to resolve inter-
subproject dependencies, which would unnecessarily increase the
call graph generation time and size. In contrast, CRYPTOGUARD
creates and consults a directed acyclic graph (DAG) representing
subproject dependencies. It helps i) exclude unnecessary subprojects
and ii) analyze independent sub-projects concurrently.
3 MAPPING VULNERABILITIES TO
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
It is important to map cryptographic properties to concrete Java
programming elements that can be statically enforced. We break the
detection plan into one or more abstract steps so that each step can
be mapped to a single round of static analysis.
In this section, we illustrate the process of mapping cryptographic
vulnerabilities to concrete program analysis tasks. This mapping
process is manual and only needs to be performed once for each
vulnerability. In what follows, we use rule i to refer to the detection
of vulnerability i in Table 1.
For example, in Rule 4 we detect the abuse of
HostnameVerifier interface. Ideally, an imple-
mentation of HostnameVerifier must use the
javax.net.ssl.SSLSession parameter verify method to
verify the hostname. Using the return statement as the slicing
criterion, we perform intra-procedural backward slicing of verify
method to implement this rule.
Rule 5 is to detect the abuse of the X509TrustManager
interface. We reduce the task to detecting 3 concrete cases:
i) throwing no exception after validating a certificate in
checkServerTrusted, ii) unpinned self-signed certificate with
an expiration check, and iii) not providing a valid list of certificates
in getAcceptedIssuers. For Case i), intuitively, our program
analysis needs to search for the occurrences of throw or propagated
exception. throw is the slicing criterion in the (intra-procedural)
backward slicing. Simple parsing is inadequate, as the analysis needs
to learn the type of the thrown exception.
Rule 6 is to detect whether any method uses SSLSocket directly
without performing hostname verification. Intuitively, to detect this
vulnerability, we need to track whether an SSLSocket created
from SSLSocketFactory influences the SSLSession param-
eter of a verify method (of a HostnameVerifier) invocation.
In addition, we also need to check whether the return value of the
verify method is used in a condition checking statement (e.g.,
if). For detection, we use forward program slicing to identify all
the instructions that are influenced by the SSLSocketFactory
instance. Among these instructions, we examine three cases i) an
SSLSocket is created, ii) an SSLSession is created and used
in verify, and iii) the return value of verify method is used
to make decisions. These three cases represent a correct use of
SSLSocket with proper hostname verification.
Rule 15 is to detect insecure asymmetric cipher configurations
(e.g., 1024-bit RSA). A more concrete goal is to detect an insecure
default key size use and an explicit definition of insecure key size.
The tasks of program analysis are to determine a) whether the key
size is defined explicitly or by default, b) the statically defined key
size, and c) the key generation algorithm. For Task a), our analy-
sis uses forward slicing to determine whether the initialize
method is invoked to set the key size of a key-pair generator. For
Tasks b) and c), we use two rounds of backward program slicing to
determine the key size and algorithm, respectively. We also employ
on-demand field sensitivity for data-only classes in Task b). The
analyses for Rule 15 are the most complex in CRYPTOGUARD.
Mappings for other rules are relatively straightforward and can
be deduced from Table 1. For example, ↑ in Rule 1 & 2 means these
rules are implemented using inter-procedural backward slicing and
↓ indicates inter-procedural forward slicing is used for on-demand
data-only class field sensitivity. We also list the slicing criteria used
for each rule in Tables 8, 9 and 10 in Appendix.
4 CRYPTO-SPECIFIC SLICING
We specialize static def-use analysis [71] and forward and backward
program slicings [49] for detecting Java cryptographic API misuses.
We break the detection strategy into one or more steps, so that a
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Table 1: Cryptographic vulnerabilities, properties, and static analysis methods used. High, medium, and low risk levels are denoted
by H/M/L, respectively. CPA stands for chosen ciphertext attack, MitM for man-in-the-middle, C/I/A for confidentiality, integrity,
and authenticity, respectively. ↑ means backward slicing and ↓ means forward slicing. Slicing is inter-procedural unless otherwise
specified (e.g., intra, both). Refinement insights are applied for all the inter-procedural backward slicing.
No Vulnerabilities Attack Type Crypto Property Severity Our Analysis Method
1 Predictable/constant cryptographic keys.
Predictable Secrets
Confidentiality H ↑ slicing & ↓ slicing
2 Predictable/constant passwords for PBE Confidentiality H ↑ slicing & ↓ slicing
3 Predictable/constant passwords for KeyStore Confidentiality H ↑ slicing & ↓ slicing
4 Custom Hostname verifiers to accept all hosts
SSL/TLS MitM
C/I/A H ↑ slicing (intra)
5 Custom TrustManager to trust all certificates C/I/A H ↑ slicing (intra)
6 Custom SSLSocketFactory w/o manual Hostname verification C/I/A H ↓ slicing (intra)
7 Occasional use of HTTP C/I/A H ↑ slicing
8 Predictable/constant PRNG seeds
Predictability
Randomness M ↑ slicing & ↓ slicing
9 Cryptographically insecure PRNGs (e.g., java.util.Random) Randomness M Search
10 Static Salts in PBE
CPA
Confidentiality M ↑ slicing & ↓ slicing
11 ECB mode in symmetric ciphers Confidentiality M ↑ slicing
12 Static IVs in CBC mode symmetric ciphers Confidentiality M ↑ slicing & ↓ slicing
13 Fewer than 1,000 iterations for PBE
Brute-force
Confidentiality L ↑ slicing & ↓ slicing
14 64-bit block ciphers (e.g., DES, IDEA, Blowfish, RC4, RC2) Confidentiality L ↑ slicing
15 Insecure asymmetric ciphers (e.g, RSA, ECC) C/A L ↑ slicing & ↓ slicing (both)
16 Insecure cryptographic hash (e.g., SHA1, MD5, MD4, MD2) Integrity H ↑ slicing
step can be realized with a single round of program slicing. After
performing the slicing, each program slice is analyzed to find the
presence of a vulnerability. Our 16 categories of vulnerabilities
require different program analysis methods for detection. Table 1
summarizes slicing techniques to detect each of the vulnerabilities.
General-purpose slicing alone is inadequate. Thus, we explain our
solution for overcoming the accuracy challenge in Section 5.
A definition of variable v is a statement that modifies v (e.g.,
declaration, assignment). A use of variable v is a statement that
reads v (e.g., a method call with v as an argument). Def-use data-
flow analysis or def-use analysis identifies the definition and use
statements and describes their dependency relations. Given a slicing
criterion, which is a statement or a variable in a statement (e.g., a
parameter of an API), backward program slicing is to compute a set
of program statements that affect the slicing criterion in terms of data
flow. Given a slicing criterion, forward program slicing is to compute
a set of program statements that are affected by the slicing criterion
in terms of data flow. Given a program and a slicing criterion, a
program slicer returns a list of program slices. Intra-procedural
program slicing mechanisms use def-use analysis to compute slices.
To confine inter-procedural backward slicing within security code
regions, the analysis starts from cryptographic APIs and follows
their influences recursively. This approach effectively skips the bulk
of the functional code and substantially speeds up the analysis.
4.1 Slicing Criteria and Backward Slicing
We give the intuition behind selecting slicing criteria and then present
our backward slicing techniques. The complete list of our slicing
criteria and corresponding APIs are shown in Tables 8, 9, and 10 in
Appendix.
Slicing criteria. The choice of slicing criterion directly impacts the
analysis outcomes. We choose slicing criteria based on several fac-
tors, including relevance to the vulnerability, simplicity of checking
rules, shared across multiple projects.
For inter-procedural backward slicing, the slicing criteria are de-
fined as the parameters of a target method’s invocation. For example,
to find predictable secrets (in Rules 1-3), we use the key parameter of
the constructors of SecretKeySpec as the slicing criterion. For
intra-procedural backward slicing, we define three types of slicing
criteria: i) parameters of a method, ii) assignments, and iii) throw
and return. For example, to detect insecure hostname verifiers
that accept all hosts (in Rule 4), we use the return statement in
the verify method as the slicing criterion.
Intra-procedural backward slicing. The purpose of intra-procedural
backward slicing is two-fold. It is used independently to enforce
security as well as a building block of inter-procedural back program
slicing. The intra-procedural program slicing utilizes the def-use
property of a statement to decide whether a statement should be
included in a slice or not. Our implementation utilizes the worklist
algorithm from the intra-procedural data-flow analysis framework of
Soot. During this process, if any orthogonal method invocations are
encountered, it recursively slices them to collect the arguments and
statements that influence any field or return statements within that
orthogonal methods. To reduce runtime overhead, such orthogonal
method explorations are clipped at a pre-configurable depth (1 in
our experiments). In this procedure, we use refinement insights
presented in Section 5 to exclude security irrelevant instructions that
basic use-def analysis cannot identify.
On-demand Inter-procedural backward slicing. The main respon-
sibility of this algorithm is the upward propagation of the analysis.
Our inter-procedural backward slicing builds on intra-procedural
backward slicing. Major steps of the algorithm are as follows. i)
We build a caller-callee relationship graph of all the methods of the
, ,
$r1.setText("mytext");
$r1.setKey("mykey");
...
key = $r1.getKey();
Figure 2: Indirect field access using orthogonal invocations on
data-only class object $r1.
program. The call-graph construction uses class-hierarchy analysis.
ii) We identify all the callsites of the method specified in the slicing
criterion. A callsite refers to a method invocation. iii) For all the call-
sites, we obtain all the inter-procedural backward slices by invoking
intra-procedural slicing recursively to follow the caller chain. iv) Our
procedure is field sensitive. Typical field initialization statements
are assignments. After encountering a field assignment, the analysis
follows the influences through fields, recursively.
4.2 Forward Slicing
Some of our analysis demands forward slicing, which inspects the
statements occurring after the slicing criterion.
Intra-procedural forward slicing. We design intra-procedural for-
ward slicing for Rules 6 (SSLSocketFactory w/o Hostname verifi-
cation) and 15 (Weak asymmetric crypto). The operation of intra-
procedural forward slicing is similar to that of intra-procedural back-
ward slicing. In forward slicing, we choose assignments as the slicing
criteria. The traversal follows the order of the execution, i.e., going
forward. Because problematic code regions for Rules 6 and 15 are
confined within a method, their forward slicing analyses do not need
to be inter-procedural.
Inter-procedural forward slicing.
Given an assign instruction or a constant as the slicing criterion,
we perform the inter-procedural forward slicing to identify the in-
structions that are influenced by the slicing criterion in terms of
def-use relations. Our version of inter-procedural forward slicing
operates on the slices obtained from inter-procedural backward pro-
gram slicing. Our inter-procedural backward slicing produces an
ordered collection of instructions combined from all visited methods.
We define a class as a data-only class, if the fields of the class
are only visible within orthogonal method invocations. We use inter-
procedural forward slicing for on-demand field sensitivity of data-
only classes, as the field sensitivity during upward propagation (inter-
procedural backward slicing) does not cover them. In Figure 2, $r1
is an object of data-only class, where its fields are accessed indirectly
with an orthogonal method (i.e, getKey) invocation. Given a constant,
using inter-procedural forward slicing, CRYPTOGUARD determines
whether the constant influences any field of a data-only class object
and records it. Later on, when it encounters an assign invocation
on the same object and observes that the previously recorded field
influences the return statement, then it reports the constant. Through
this on-demand field sensitivity for data-only class, CRYPTOGUARD
knows that constant mytext (Figure 2) is not a hard-coded key.
↓ in Table 1 represents the use of forward slicing for on-demand
data-only class field sensitivity 4.
4Current prototype uses this field sensitivity for 8 rules.
5 REFINEMENT FOR FP REDUCTION
We design a set of refinement algorithms to exclude security irrele-
vant instructions to reduce false alarms. These refinement insights
(RI) are deduced by observing common programming idioms and
language restrictions. We also discuss the possibility of false nega-
tives (i.e., missed detection).
5.1 Overview of Refinement Insights (RI)
Eight of our rules (1, 2, 3, 8, 10, 12, 13 and 15) require identifying
constants/predictable values in a program slice. The purpose is to
ensure that no data (e.g., cryptographic keys, passwords, IVs, and
seeds) is hardcoded or solely derived from any hardcoded values.
Use of any predictable values (e.g., Timestamp, DeviceID) is also
insecure for Rules 1, 2, 3 and 8. However, there are many constan-
t/predictable values that do not impact security. We refer to them
as pseudo-influences. Pseudo-influences are a major source of false
positives.
Based on empirical observations of common programming idioms
and language restrictions, we invent five strategies to systematically
remove irrelevant constants/predictable values from slices and re-
duce pseudo-influences, which are summarized next. For eight of our
rules, these refinement insights yield a 76% reduction in total alerts
for Apache projects and 80% reduction for Android applications
(Section 5.4). In CRYPTOGUARD, rule checkers apply these refine-
ments on constants/predictable values in program slices to remove
pseudo-influences.
• RI-I: Removal of state indicators. We discard constants/pre-
dictable values that are used to describe the state of a variable
during an orthogonal method invocation.
• RI-II: Removal of resource identifiers. We discard constants/pre-
dictable values that are used as the identifier of a value source
during an orthogonal method invocation.
• RI-III: Removal of bookkeeping indices. We discard con-
stants/predictable values that are used as the index or size of
any data structures. Specifically, RI-III discards any influences
on i) size parameter of an array or a collection instantiation, ii)
indices of an array, iii) indices of a collection.
• RI-IV: Removal of contextually incompatible constants. We dis-
card constants/predictable values, if their types are incompati-
ble with the analysis context. For example, a boolean variable
cannot be used as a key, IV, or salt.
• RI-V: Removal of constants in infeasible paths. Some constant
initializations are updated along the path to the slicing criterion.
We need to discard the initializations that do not have a valid
path of influence to the criterion.
RI-I, RI-II and RI-IV are used to handle the clipping orthogo-
nal method explorations, which can occur due to phantom method
invocations or pre-configured clipping at a certain depth. RI-III is
used to achieve data structure awareness and RI-V are used to com-
pensate path insensitivity. The breakdown of the total reduction of
false alarms in our experiment shows that RI-II and RI-III are most
effective in Apache and Android apps (Figure 4). In the next two sub-
sections, we highlight the details of two refinement insights based on
removing state indicators and resource identifiers. Details for other
RIs can be found in Section 10.1 of Appendix.
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5.2 RI-I: Removal of State Indicators
Clipping of orthogonal method exploration can cause false positives
if the arguments of method is used to describe the state of a variable.
Consider UTF-8 in Line 38 of Figure 1(a). Its Jimple5 representation
is as follows, where $r2 represents variable key, $r4 represents
keyBytes, and virtualinvoke is for invoking the non-static
method of a class.
$r4 = virtualinvoke $r2.<java.lang.String: byte[]
getBytes(java.lang.String)>("UTF-8")
If the analysis is clipped so that it cannot explore the getBytes
method, then a def-use analysis shows that constant UTF-8 influ-
ences the value of $r4 (i.e., keyBytes). Thus, a straightforward
detection method would report UTF-8 as a hardcoded key. How-
ever, UTF-8 is for describing the encoding of $r2 and can be
safely ignored. We refer to this type of constants as state indicator
pseudo-influence.
The use of refinement insights have direct impact on analysis out-
comes. For example, discarding arguments of virtualinvoke
may generate false negatives. Suppose virtualinvoke
is used to set a key in a KeyHolder instance with
some constant: virtualinvoke $r5.<KeyHolder: void
setKey(java.lang.String)>("abcd"). Constant abcd
needs to be flagged. On the contrary, we observe that arguments of
virtualinvoke appearing in assign statements are typically used
to describe the state of a variable and can be ignored. In summary,
RI-I states that i) arguments of any virtualinvoke method in-
vocation in an assignment instruction can be regarded as pseudo-
influences, and ii) any constants that influence these arguments can
also be discarded.
5.3 RI-II: Removal of Source Identifiers
Another type of pseudo-influences due to the clipping of orthogonal
method exploration is the identifiers of value sources. We use an
example to illustrate the importance of this insight. For the code be-
low, a straightforward analysis would flag constant ENCRYPT_KEY.
However, it is an identifier for retrieving a value from a Java Map
data structure, and thus a false positive.
$r30 = interfaceinvoke r29.<java.util.Map:
java.lang.Object get(java.lang.Object)>("ENCRYPT_KEY")
i) Retrieving values from an external source. Static method invo-
cations (staticinvoke in Jimple) in assign statements are typ-
ically used to read values from external sources, e.g., Line 15 in
Figure 1(a):
$r4 = staticinvoke <Context: java.lang.String
getProperty(java.lang.String)>(src)
Variable src refers to the identifier, not the actual value of the
key. Thus, it is a pseudo influence. To avoid such pseudo-influences,
RI-II discards any arguments of staticinvoke that appear in an
assignment. Although staticinvoke may be used to transform
a value from one representation to another, it is unlikely to use
staticinvoke to transform a constant.
5Jimple is an intermediate representation (IR) of a Java program.
Figure 3: Reduction of false positives with refinement insights
in 46 Apache projects (94 root-subprojects) and 6,181 Android
apps. Top 6 rules with maximum reductions are shown.
Figure 4: Breakdown of the reduction of false positives due to
five of our refinement insights.
5.4 Evaluation of Refinement Methods
We compared the numbers of reported alerts before and after employ-
ing the five refinement algorithms for 46 Apache projects and 6,181
Android apps. Our experiments show that refinement algorithms
reduce the total alerts by 76% in Apache and 80% in Android. For
Apache projects, we manually confirmed that all the removed alerts
are indeed false positives6. All constant-related rules (including 1, 2,
3, and 12) greatly benefit from the refinements and have significant
reduction of irrelevant alerts. Results for top six rules with maxi-
mum reductions are shown in Figure 3. The detailed breakdown is
shown in Figure 4. The most effective refinement insight for Apache
and Android are RI-III (removal of array/collection bookkeeping
information).
With refinements enabled, there are a total of 1,295 alerts for
the 46 Apache projects. Our careful manual source-code analysis
confirms that 1,277 alerts are true positives, resulting in a precision
of 98.61%. Out of the 18 false positives, 1 case is due to path
insensitivity and 17 to clipping orthogonal explorations (discussed
in Section 7). All experiments reported in the next section were
conducted with refinements enabled.
6Regarding the validity of the manual analysis, the manual confirmation of alerts was
conducted by a second-year Ph.D. student with a prior Master degree in cybersecurity
(the second author), under the close guidance of a professor and a senior Ph.D. student
(the first author).
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6 SECURITY FINDINGS AND BENCHMARK
EVALUATION
Our experimental evaluation aims to answer the following questions.
• What are the security findings in Apache Projects? Do Apache
projects have too many high-risk vulnerabilities such as hard-
coded secrets or MitM vulnerabilities? (Section 6.1)
• What are the security findings in Android Apps? Do third-party
libraries have high-risk vulnerabilities? (Section 6.2)
• How does CRYPTOGUARD compare with CrySL, SpotBugs,
and the free trial version of Coverity on benchmarks or real-
world projects? (Section 6.3)
Selection and pre-processing of programs. We selected 46 popu-
lar Apache projects that have crypto API uses. The popularity is
measured with the numbers of stars and forks in Github. The maxi-
mum, minimum and average Line of Code (LoC) are around 2, 571K
(Hadoop), 1.1K (Commons Crypto) and 402K, respectively. We per-
form subproject dependency analysis to build DAGs by parsing
build scripts. Subproject dependency analysis was automated for
gradle and maven, and was manual for Ant. We identified the root-
subprojects, which are sub-projects that have no incoming edges on
the subproject dependency DAG. We analyzed 94 root-subprojects in
total7. We downloaded 6, 181 high popularity Android apps from the
Google app market covering 58 categories. The median value of the
number of apps per category is 120. We used Soot to decompile .apk
files to Java bytecode in order to interface with CRYPTOGUARD. We
use online APK decompiler 8 to obtain human-readable source code
for manual verification.
CRYPTOGUARD runtime. We ran 4 concurrent instances of CRYP-
TOGUARD in an Intel Xeon(R) X5650 server (2.67GHz CPU and
32GB RAM). Runtime increases with the use of cryptography APIs.
For Apache projects, the average runtime was 3.3 minutes with a
median of around 1 minute. For Android apps, we terminated un-
finished analysis after 10 minutes. The average runtime was 3.2
minutes with a median of 2.85 minutes, including the cutoff ones.
552 (9%) of 6,181 app’s analysis did not finish within 10 minutes,
on which CRYPTOGUARD generated partial results.9
6.1 Security Findings in Apache Projects
Out of the 46 Apache projects, 39 projects have at least one type of
cryptographic misuses and 33 projects have at least two types. Ta-
ble 6 summarizes our security findings in screening Apache projects.
Predictable keys (Rules 1 and 2), HTTP URL (Rule 7), insecure hash
functions (Rule 16), and the insecure PRNGs (Rule 9) are the most
common types of vulnerabilities in Apache. As predictable values,
we only observed constants for all these rules. We did not observe
any predictable seeds under Rule 8.
6.1.1 Vulnerabilities from Predictable Secrets. 16 Apache
projects (37 sub-rootprojects) have hardcoded keys (Rule 1, 2). Three
(Meecrowave, Kylin, and Cloudstack) of them use hardcoded sym-
metric keys (Rule 1). Meecrowave uses DESede (i.e., Triple DES10)
7We exclude 15 test root-subprojects.
8http://www.javadecompilers.com/apk
9Most of them missed results from Rule 7, which CRYPTOGUARD runs the last.
10Triple DES itself is considered insecure. OpenSSL removed the support of Triple
DES. NIST recommended moving to AES as soon as possible [68].
Table 2: Breakdown of Accuracy in Apache Projects. Duplicates
are handled at root-subproject level (total 82 root-subprojects)
level. For Rules 1, 2, 3, 8, 10, 12, each constant/predictable value
of an array/collection is considered as an individual violation.
Rules Total Alerts # True Positives Precision
(1,2) Predictable Keys 264 248 94.14 %
(3) Hardcoded Store Pass 148 148 100 %
(4) Dummy Hostname Verifier 12 12 100 %
(5) Dummy Cert. Validation 30 30 100 %
(6) Used Improper Socket 4 4 100 %
(7) Used HTTP 222 222 100 %
(8) Predictable Seeds 0 0 0%
(9) Untrusted PRNG 142 142 100 %
(10) Static Salts 112 112 100 %
(11) ECB mode for Symm. Crypto 41 41 100 %
(12) Static IV 41 40 97.56 %
(13) <1000 PBE iterations 43 42 97.67 %
(14) Broken Symm. Crypto Algorithm 86 86 100 %
(15) Insecure Asymm. Crypto 12 12 100 %
(16) Broken Hash 138 138 100 %
Total 1,295 1,277 98.61 %
1 <http:tlsClientParameters disableCNCheck="true">
2 ...
3 </http:tlsClientParameters>
(a) A portion of https-cfg-client.xml
1 ...
2 } else if (tlsClientParameters.isDisableCNCheck()) {
3 verifier = new AllowAllHostnameVerifier();
4 }
(b) A portion of SSLUtils.java
Figure 5: Example code in Apache Cxf that disables hostname
verification checks by default.
1 public static String sendUpsRequest(...) {
2 ...
3 http.setAllowUntrusted(true);
4 ... }
(a) A portion of UpsServices.java
1 SSLContext getSSLContext(String alias, boolean trustAny) {
2 ...
3 TrustManager[] tm;
4 if (trustAny) {
5 tm = SSLUtil.getTrustAnyManagers(); } ... }
(b) A portion of SSLUtil.java
Figure 6: Example code in Apache Ofbiz that enables trusting
all certificates by default while invoking UPS service.
for obfuscation purpose. Unfortunately, deterministic keys make it
trivial to break the obfuscation. Kylin (635 Forks, 1325 Stars) uses
AES to encrypt user passwords. However, using hardcoded keys
make these passwords vulnerable. In Apache Cloudstack, it appears
that hardcoded keys are used in test code, which is accidentally
packaged with the production code.
For Rule 2, we found that most of the hardcoded passwords
in PBE serve as the default. The most common default password
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for PBE is masterpassphrase (e.g., Ambari and Knox). Mani-
foldcf uses NowIsTheTime. Setting PBE code to take the default
hardcoded passwords without sufficient warnings are risky. Distribu-
tions using the default configuration are susceptible to the recovery of
the plaintext password by an attacker who has the access to the PBE
ciphertext. Apache Ranger (165 forks, 155 stars) uses a hardcoded
password as default for PBE for all distributions. Its installation Wiki
does not mention anything about it. System administrators unaware
of this setup are likely not to change the default. This coding practice
significantly weakens the security guarantee of PBE.
For Rule 3, most common hardcoded passwords for KeyStores
(for storing private keys) are changeit (e.g., Tomcat, Knox, Judi,
Ofbiz and Wss4j) and none (e.g., Knox, Hive and Hadoop). Most
of them are set as default. There are 9 projects that have both pre-
dictable keys (Rule 1, 2) and hardcoded KeyStore passwords (Rule
3), indicating persistent insecure coding styles.
Insecure common practices. During manual analysis, we found
three types of insecure common practices in Apache projects for
storing secrets: i) hard-coding default keys or passwords in the source
code, ii) storing plaintext keys or passwords in configuration files, iii)
storing encrypted passwords in configuration files with decryption
keys in plaintext in source code or configuration. Java provides a
special security APIs (e.g., Callback and CallbackHandler)
to prompt users for secrets (e.g., passwords). However, none of these
projects provides any code to support this option.
Sysadmins are forced to store plaintext passwords in the filesys-
tem unless they personally modify the code. The biggest danger that
these insecure secret-storage practices bring to users is probably the
inflated sense of security and not being able to see the actual risks.
6.1.2 Vulnerabilities from SSL/TLS MitM. Man-in-the-
Middle (MitM) vulnerabilities are high risk in our threat model.
5 Apache projects (8 root-subprojects) have dummy hostname ver-
ifiers that accept any hostnames (Rule 4), including Spark (15086
forks, 16324 stars), Ambari (814 forks, 778 stars), Cxf (706 forks,
398 stars), Ofbiz, and Meecrowave. 6 Apache projects have dummy
trust managers that trust any certificates (Rule 5), including Spark,
Ambari, Cloudstack, Qpid-broker, Jclouds, and Ofbiz. It appears
that most projects offer them as an additional connectivity option.
Our manual analysis reveals that some projects set this insecure
implementation as default (e.g., Figure 5 and Figure 6). In Figure 6,
we see that Ofbiz uses insecure SSL/TLS configurations by default
while using UPS (a shipping company) service. When plain sockets
are used, it is recommended to verify the hostname manually. We
found 3 projects that do not follow this rule and accept any arbi-
trary hostnames. We also found 7 projects (24 root-subprojects) that
occasionally use the HTTP protocol for communication.
Listing 1: A vulnerable code snippet from Apache Ranger to
demonstrate various security issues
1 PBEKeySpec getPBEParameterSpec(String password) throws Throwable {
2 MessageDigest md = MessageDigest.getInstance(MD_ALGO); // MD5
3 byte[] saltGen = md.digest(password.getBytes());
4 byte[] salt = new byte[SALT_SIZE];
5 System.arraycopy(saltGen, 0, salt, 0, SALT_SIZE);
6 int iteration = password.toCharArray().length + 1;
7 return new PBEKeySpec(password.toCharArray(), salt, iteration);
8 }
6.1.3 Medium and Low Severity Vulnerabilities. It is im-
portant to be aware of the medium and low-risk vulnerabilities in
the system and to recognize that the risk levels may increase under
different adversarial models.
We found hardcoded salts in 4 projects including Apache Ranger,
Manifoldcf, Juddi, and Wicket. We also observe the use of ECB
mode in AES in 5 projects and predictable IVs in 2 projects with
a total of 40 occurrences. We found 5 projects that use PBE with
less than 1,000 iterations (Rule 13). Ranger and Wicket projects use
17 iterations for PBE; and Incubator-Taverna-Workbench and Juddi
projects use 20 iterations, much fewer than the required 1,000.
Listing 1 shows a code snippet from Ranger, which has multiple
issues. The number of iterations is proportional to the password size
(Line 6), which is far less than 1, 000. In addition, this code offers a
timing side-channel. An adversary capable of measuring PBE execu-
tion time (e.g., in multi-tenant environments) may learn the length
of the password. This information can substantially decrease the
difficulty of dictionary attacks. Another issue is that the salt is com-
puted as the MD5 hash of the password (Lines 2-3). An adversary
obtaining the salt may quickly recover the password. The salt’s de-
pendence on the password itself also breaks the indistinguishability
requirement of PBE under chosen plaintext attack.
We found various occurrences of Blowfish, DES, and RC4 ci-
phers for Rule 14. Under Rule 15, we found 3 occurrences of using
default key size of 1024 and 9 other occurrences that explicitly ini-
tialize the key size to 1024. 23 projects use java.util.Random
as a PRNG (Rule 9), where two of them set static seeds to
java.util.Random. We do not observe any deterministic seed
to a java.security.SecureRandom (Rule 8).
Listing 2: An example of only checking the expiration
(checkValidity) of self-signed certificates in Yahoo Fi-
nance (TWStock) Android app. The base package name
(com.softmobile) of this class indicates that the vulnerable
code comes from a third-party library.
1 void checkServerTrusted(X509Certificate[] chain, String str){
2 if (chain == null || chain.length != 1) {
3 this.f7654a.checkServerTrusted(chain, str);
4 } else {
5 //Lack of signature verification and others
6 chain[0].checkValidity();}}
Listing 3: An example of ignoring exceptions in
checkServerTrusted in Sina Finance Android app.
1 void checkServerTrusted(X509Certificate[] chain, String str){
2 try {
3 this.f7427a.checkServerTrusted(chain, str);
4 } catch (CertificateException e) {}} //Ignores exception
Listing 4: The use of SSLSocket without manual hostname
verification in ProTaxi Driver Android app.
1 try {
2 SSLContext instance = SSLContext.getInstance("TLS");
3 ...
4 this.webSocketClient
5 .setSocket(instance.getSocketFactory().createSocket());
6 } catch (Throwable e) { ... }
7 this.webSocketClient.connect();
, ,
Table 3: Experimental results on the CRYPTOAPI-BENCH basic and CRYPTOAPI-BENCH advanced benchmarks with CrySL, Coverity,
SpotBugs and CRYPTOGUARD. GTP stands for the ground truth positives. TP, FP, and FN are the number of true positives, false
positives, false negatives in a tool’s output, respectively. Pre. and Rec. represent precision and recall, respectively. Tools are evaluated
on 6 common rules (out of our 16 rules), i.e., the maximum common subset of all tools. For these 6 rules, there are 6 correct cases (i.e.,
true negatives) in basic and 3 correct cases in advanced, which are used for computing FPRs. Total alerts = TP + FP.
Tools CRYPTOAPI-BENCH: Basic CRYPTOAPI-BENCH: Advanced
GTP:14 Summary
Inter-Proce.
(Two)
GTP: 13
Inter-Proce.
(Multiple)
GTP: 13
Field
Sensitive
GTP: 13
FP Test/
Correct Uses
GTP: 3
Summary
TP FP FN FPR FNR Pre. Rec. TP FP FN TP FP FN TP FP FN TP FP FN FPR FNR Pre. Rec.
CrySL[44] 10 4 4 40.00 28.57 71.43 71.43 10 3 3 0 12 13 0 1 13 0 2 3 85.71 76.19 35.71 23.81
Coverity[1] 13 0 1 0.00 7.14 100.0 92.86 3 0 10 3 0 10 1 0 12 0 0 3 0.00 83.33 100.0 16.67
SpotBugs[2] 13 0 1 0.00 7.14 100.0 92.86 0 0 13 3 10 10 0 0 13 0 0 3 76.92 92.86 23.08 7.14
CRYPTOGUARD 14 0 0 0.00 0.00 100.0 100.0 13 0 0 13 0 0 13 0 0 3 0 0 0.00 0.00 100.0 100.0
6.2 Security Findings in Android Apps
Violations in apps or in libraries? We distinguished app’s
own code from libraries by using the package information
from AndroidManifest.xml.11 Android also uses it during
R.java file generation (robust against obfuscation). We found
that on average 95% of the detected vulnerabilities come from
libraries (Table 4). This result extends the observation from 7 types
of vulnerabilities (reported in [17]) to 16.
Table 4 shows the distribution of vulnerability sources for each
rule. For hardcoded KeyStore passwords (Rule 3), all violations
come from libraries. Most frequent hardcoded KeyStore pass-
word is notasecret, which is used to access certificates and
keys in Google libraries (e.g., *.googleapis.GoogleUtils,
*.googleapis.*.GoogleCredential).
Table 4: Distribution of vulnerabilities in Android apps.
Library Library App Itself Total
(Total) (Unique)
(1,2) Predictable Keys 11,634 (93.4%) 5,940 823 (6.6%) 12,457
(3) Hardcoded Store Password 431 (94.1%) 170 27 (5.8%) 458
(4) Dummy Hostname Verifier 1,148 (99.3%) 51 7 (0.7%) 1,155
(5) Dummy Cert. Validation 3,715 (96.3%) 1,317 141 (3.7%) 3,856
(6) Used Improper Socket 270 (99.6.4%) 13 1 (0.4%) 271
(7) Used HTTP 7,687 (92.5%) 2,105 623 (7.5%) 8,321
(8) Predictable Seeds 522 (96.0%) 101 22 (4.0%) 544
(9) Untrusted PRNG 26,312 (91.7%) 8,679 2,393 (8.3%) 36,223
(10) Predictable Salts 1,638 (93.2%) 774 119 (6.8%) 1,757
(11) ECB in Symm. Crypto 1657 (93.1%) 682 123 (6.9%) 1,780
(12) Predictable IVs 11,357 (94.2%) 6,048 692 (5.8%) 12,089
(13) <1000 PBE iterations 294 (94.2%) 129 18 (57.8%) 312
(14) Broken Symm. Crypto 1,668 (95.8%) 753 74 (4.2%) 1,742
(15) Insecure Asymm. Crypto 4 (3.6%) 3 107 (96.4%) 111
(16) Broken Hash 49,257 (99.0%) 7509 496 (1.0%) 49,769
Total 117,594 (95.40%) 34,274 5,666 (4.60%) 130,845
Besides Google, other high-profile library sources include Face-
book, Apache, Umeng, and Tencent (Table 5). These libraries fre-
quently appear in different applications. We distinguished these
libraries using base packages and ignored obfuscations.
Overview of other Android findings. We found exposed secrets, simi-
lar to Apache projects. Table 6 summarizes the discovered vulnera-
bilities in Android applications. The categories of untrusted PRNG
(Rule 9) and broken hash (Rule 16) have the most violations. In-
terestingly, we observed 544 cases of predictable seeds (Rule 8).
13 cases of them used time-stamps from <java.lang.System:
long currentTimeMillis()> API calls.
11An .apk contains both the app code and the libraries.
Table 5: Violations in 5 popular libraries (manually confirmed).
Package name Violated rules
com.google.api 3, 4, 5, 7
com.umeng.analytics 7, 9, 12, 16
com.facebook.ads 5, 9, 16
org.apache.commons 5, 9, 16
com.tencent.open 2, 7, 9
Compared with Apache projects, Android apps have higher
percentages of SSL/TLS API misuses (Rules 4, 5 and 6) and
HTTP use (Rule 7). For example, 25.30% of Android apps have
dummy trust manager (Rule 5), which is more than 2 times of the
number in Apache (11.70%) as shown in Table 6 in Appendix.
Our analysis can detect sophisticated cases that Google Play’s
built-in screening is likely to miss. We give code snippets for such
cases (Listing 2, 3, 4). CRYPTOGUARD detects a case where devel-
opers allow unpinned self-signed certificates with a mere expiration
check, as shown in Listing 2. Another case is where developers ig-
nore the exception in checkServerTrusted method as shown
in Listing 3. In addition, CRYPTOGUARD detects 271 occurrences
of improper use of SSLSocket without manual Hostname verifi-
cation in 210 apps. One such example is shown in Listing 4, where
SSLSocket is used in WebSocketClient without manually
verifying the hostname 12. In comparison, Google Play’s inspection
appears to only detect obvious misuses [4].
Grouping security violations by app popularity or category did
not show substantial differences across groups.
6.3 Comparison with Existing Tools
We compare the accuracy and runtime of CRYPTOGUARD with three
existing tools, i.e., CrySL [44], Coverity [1], and SpotBugs [2]13.
During our experiments, we use CrySL 1.0 (commit id 10e86fdb),
SpotBugs 3.0.1 (from SWAMP) and the results from Coverity was
obtained before Jan 07, 2019.
Benchmark preparation. First, we14 had to construct CRYPTOAPI-
BENCH, a comprehensive benchmark for comparing the quality of
cryptographic vulnerability detection tools. Regarding the existing
12Guide for the correct use can be found at https://developer.android.com/training/artic
les/security-ssl#WarningsSslSocket.
13CryptoLint’s code is unavailable.
14The person (third author) who led the benchmark design is different from the person
(first author) who implemented CRYPTOGUARD.
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benchmark DroidBench [16], i) DroidBench does not cover crypto-
graphic APIs, ii) the free web version of Coverity requires source
code, however DroidBench only contains APK binaries.
CRYPTOAPI-BENCH covers all 16 cryptographic rules specified
in Table 1. There are 38 basic test cases and 74 advanced test cases.
The basic benchmark contains 25 straightforward API misuses and
13 correct API uses (i.e., true negative cases). The advanced cases
have more complex scenarios, including 42 inter-procedural cases15,
20 field-sensitive cases, 9 false positive test cases (for evaluating
the ability of recognizing irrelevant elements), and 3 correct API
uses (i.e., true negative cases). Figures 7 and 8 in Appendix show
the distributions of test cases per rule and per API, respectively.
Augmenting the benchmark with more test cases is our ongoing
work. See Github for the most updated version https://github.com/C
ryptoGuardOSS/cryptoapi-bench.
Benchmark comparison. To maintain fairness in our comparison,
we only report the benchmark results for the six shared rules (1, 2, 3,
11, 14, 16) that are covered by all the tools, CrySL [44], Coverity [1],
SpotBugs [2], and ours. Due to the lack of documentation, we had
to infer a tool’s coverage based on whether or not it ever generates
any alert in that category. We show the results in Table 3.
For the basic benchmark, SpotBugs and Coverity perform well,
but not CrySL. Our investigation reveals that CrySL’s false posi-
tives are mainly due to their rules being overly strict. For example,
CrySL would raise an alert if the password for PBE is derived from
a String typed variable, or a symmetric key is not generated by a
key generator. It cannot recognize 4 correct API uses in the evalu-
ation (out of 9). The root cause for this overly specific definitions
of security is likely the CrySL’s language restrictions on constraint
definitions. For the advance benchmark, both CrySL and SpotBugs
generate false positives, when a variable is passed through multi-
ple methods. For all cases, Coverity has zero false positives, likely
because of the use of symbolic execution and/or path-sensitive anal-
ysis16. However, Coverity misses multiple advanced vulnerability
scenarios (for rules that it does cover in the basic benchmark).
Table 7 in Appendix presents the comparison for all 16 rules (not
just the 6 common rules as in above). When testing all 16 rules,
CRYPTOGUARD failed to report 11 misuses (i.e., false negatives).
We discuss the causes in Section 7.
Runtime comparison. We ran CrySL and CRYPTOGUARD on 10
randomly selected Apache root-subprojects. Unfortunately, CrySL
crashed and exit prematurely for 7 of them. For the 3 completed
projects, CrySL is slower, but comparable on 2 projects (5 vs. 3
seconds, 25 vs. 19 seconds). However, it is 3 orders of magnitude
slower than CRYPTOGUARD on kerbaros-codec.17
We choose not to compare with SpotBugs – the comparison would
not be meaningful, because its analysis is mostly based on the syn-
tactical matching of source code to known bug patterns [40, 62]. For
the free web version of Coverity, we are unable to obtain its runtime.
Summary of experimental findings.
• Our refinement algorithms are effective. They bring an 76%
reduction in alarms for Apache projects and an 80% reduction
for Android applications. We manually confirmed that all the
1521 cases involve two methods and 21 cases involve more than two methods.
16Coverity is close sourced, so we are unable to confirm.
17Reported runtime is the average of three runs.
removed alerts are indeed false positives. Manually examining
the remaining 1,295 Apache alerts (after refinements) confirms
our precision of 98.61%.
• 39 out of the 46 Apache projects have at least one type of
cryptographic misuses and 33 have at least two types. There is
a widespread insecure practice of storing plaintext passwords in
code or in configuration files. Insecure uses of SSL/TLS APIs
are set as the default configuration in some cases.
• 5,596 (91%) out of the 6,181 Android apps have at least one
type of cryptographic misuses and 4,884 (79%) apps have at
least two types. 95% of the vulnerabilities come from the li-
braries that are packaged with the applications. Some libraries
are from large software firms. CRYPTOGUARD’s detection for
SSL/TLS API misuses is more comprehensive than the built-in
screening offered by Google Play.
• In terms of detecting complex misuses, CRYPTOGUARD out-
performs all leading solutions (in Table 3). It substantially
outperforms CrySL in terms of robustness and runtime.
7 DISCUSSION
Code correction. Most of the Apache developers’ responses to our
vulnerability disclosure reports were prompt and insightful. We high-
light the feedback from some projects. Apache Spark promised to
remove the support of dummy hostname verifier and trust store. Of-
biz promised to fix the reported issues of constant IVs and KeyStore
passwords. Apache Ranger already fixed our report of constant de-
fault values for PBE [10] and insecure cryptographic primitives [5].
Regarding MD5, Apache Hadoop justifies that its MD5 use is for the
per-block checksums for Hadoop file systems (HDFS)’s consistency
and the setup does not assume the presence of active adversaries.
For some cases, developers explained that certain operational
constraints (e.g., backward compatibility for clients) prevent them
from fixing the problems. For example, Apache Tomcat server has to
use MD5 in its digest authentication code, because major browsers
do not support secure hash functions (as defined in RFC 7616).
However, digest authentication is rarely used in the wild18.
The thorniest issue is secret storage. One justification for devel-
opers’ choice of storing plaintext passwords or keys in file systems
is for supporting humanless environments (e.g., automated scripts
to manage services). However, first, not all deployment scenarios
are server farms in a humanless environment. Projects should also
provide the secure option, which is to use Java callback to prompt hu-
man operators for passwords which can be used to unlock/generate
other passwords or keys on the fly. Second, not properly disclosing
and documenting the insecure configurations does a great disservice
to the project’s users.
Our limitations. No static analysis tool is perfect. CRYPTOGUARD
is no exception. We discuss the detection limitations of CRYPTO-
GUARD and future improvements.
False positives. One source of false positives comes from the path
insensitivity. For example, CRYPTOGUARD raises an alert if the
variable iteration is assigned with a value of 0 for the following
code snippet (from project jackrabbit-oak). However, this alert is a
false positive, since this assignment is on an infeasible path.
18https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/152935/why-is-there-no-adoption-of-
rfc-7616-http-digest-auth
, ,
int iteration = 0;
...
if (iteration < NO_ITERATION) { // NO_ITERATION = 1
iteration = DEFAULT_ITERATION;
}
Another source of false positives is the clipping of orthogonal ex-
ploration, which can be substantially reduced by re-configuring the
prototype to explore deeper. However, this will impact the runtime.
In addition, CRYPTOGUARD detects the existence of API misuses in
a code base but does not verify that the vulnerable code will be trig-
gered at runtime. This issue is a general limitation of static program
analysis. Apache Spark confirmed insecure PRNG uses, but stated
that the affected code regions are not security critical.19 However,
eliminating this type of alerts is difficult, if possible at all, as the
analysis needs to be aware of custom defined security criteria (e.g.,
what constitutes critical security) with in-depth knowledge about
project semantics.
False negatives. For the full benchmark evaluation in Table 7 in
Appendix, CRYPTOGUARD has 11 false negatives (i.e., missed de-
tection). All these cases are due to our refinements after clipping or-
thogonal explorations. For example, RI-II would ignore 6A5B7C8A
as a pseudo-influence from the following instruction, if orthogonal
explorations are clipped to explore parseHexBinary method. byte[]
key = DatatypeConverter.parseHexBinary("6A5B7C8A").
These false negatives can be avoided by increasing the depth of
the orthogonal exploration. However, these conversions are mostly
required to absorb values from external sources (e.g., file system,
network). Any such conversions of static values under the rules
of Table 1 are highly unlikely. Outside the benchmark, we did not
observe any such cases during our manual investigation of Apache
alerts. We also manually investigated 5 randomly selected Apache
projects for false negatives from within orthogonal invocations (due
to clipping) and did not observe any.
CRYPTOGUARD runs the intra-procedural forward slicing for
Rules 6 and 15, where an inter-procedural forward slicing could
potentially improve the coverage. For Rule 15, this change might
not make much difference, as KeyPairGenerator creation
and its initialization usually occur in the same method. For Rule
6, our current implementation ignores the direct sub-classes of
SSLSocketFactory to avoid false positives. Inter-procedural
slicing could extend the analysis to the sub-classes.
Another limitation of our work is that the coverage of our bench-
mark needs further improvement, in terms of incorporating path
sensitive test cases and increasing the diversity of APIs involved.
Our ongoing work includes enhancing CRYPTOAPI-BENCH.
8 RELATED WORK
Tools to detect cryptographic misuses. Cryptographic misuse detec-
tion tools are typically constructed into two broad groups, i.e., static
analysis (e.g., CryptoLint [31], MalloDroid [33], FixDroid [57],
CogniCrypt [43] and CrySL [44]) and dynamic analysis (e.g., SMV-
Hunter [65], AndroSSL [34] and K-Hunt [47]). For example, Mal-
loDroid [33] uses a list of known insecure implementations of
HostnameVerifier and TrustManager to screen Android
apps. In [41], authors showed that generating false positives is one
of the most significant barrier to adopt static analysis tools. This
19It is unclear why Spark chose to use insecure PRNG, even for non-security purposes.
false positive problem also exists in anomaly and intrusion detec-
tion systems [48, 72]. When screening large projects, virtually all
static slicing solutions in this space (e.g., [31]) might generate a non-
negligible amount of false positives. Contextual refinements similar
to CRYPTOGUARD’s is necessary to achieve high precision in prac-
tice. In terms of the coverage, CRYPTOGUARD covers more rules
than CryptoLint [31], CrySL [44] and MalloDroid [33] combined.
Other misuse detection tools (e.g., FixDroid [57] and Cog-
niCrypt [43]) were mainly built for the user-experience study
with the goal of making detection tools developer-friendly, as op-
posed to a deployment-quality screening solution. For example,
FixDroid focuses on providing real-time feedback to developers.
CogniCrypt’s [43] focus is on code generation (in Eclipse IDE) for
several common cryptographic tasks (e.g., data encryption).
Dynamic analysis tools are complementary to static analysis ones.
Most of them use a simple static analysis to first narrow-down the
number of potential apps for dynamic analysis. For example, SMV-
Hunter [65] looks for apps that contain any custom implementa-
tion of X509TrustManager or HostNameVerifier for ini-
tial screening.
Other static analysis tools. TaintCrypt [61] uses static taint analy-
sis to discover library-level cryptographic implementation issues in
C/C++ cryptographic libraries (e.g., OpenSSL). It uses symbolic
execution based path exploration to reduce false alarms, which is
usually costly. Researchers found that misusing non-cryptographic
APIs in Android also have serious security implications. These APIs
include APIs to access sensitive information (such as location, IMEI,
and passwords) [56], APIs for fingerprint protection [23], and cloud
service APIs for information storage [74]. The methodology de-
scribed in this paper can be applied to address these APIs. Re-
cently, data driven techniques to identify API misuses have been
proposed [58, 73]. These techniques uses lightweight static analysis
to infer rules from examples that can be used for detection. In [54],
authors proposed a Bayesian framework for automatically learning
correct API uses that can be used for anomaly-based API misuse
detection. Efforts on automatically repairing insecure code have
also been reported [50, 51, 60]. Static code analysis has been exten-
sively used for other related software problems as well, including
malware analysis and detection [32, 59, 70], vulnerability discover-
ies [22, 45], and data-leak detection [25]. In [28], Chi et al. presented
a system to infer client behaviors by leveraging symbolic executions
of client-side code. They used such knowledge to filter anomalous
traffic. Fuzzing has been demonstrated to automatically discover-
ing software vulnerabilities [29, 63, 64]. These techniques aim to
find input guided vulnerabilities that result in immediately observ-
able behaviors (e.g., triggering program crashes [64] or anomalous
protocol states [29, 63]). It is unclear how to use fuzzing to detect
cryptographic vulnerabilities (e.g., predictable IVs/secrets, legacy
primitives) that do not exhibit easily observable anomalous behav-
iors.
9 CONCLUSIONS AND AN OPEN PROBLEM
We described our effort of producing a deployment-quality static
analysis tool CRYPTOGUARD to detect cryptographic misuses in
Java programs that developers can routinely use. This effort led to
significant new technical contributions, including language-specific
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contextual refinements for FP reduction, on-demand flow-sensitive,
context-sensitive, and field-sensitive program slicing, and benchmark
comparisons of leading solutions. We also obtained a trove of secu-
rity insights into Java secure coding practices. An open research
problem is designing a compiler that automatically transforms a
cryptographic vulnerability or rule into a static-analysis-based code-
screening algorithm, similar to what CrySL partially provides, but
with much higher expressiveness, precision, and recall.
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10 APPENDIX
10.1 Other Refinement insights
RI-III: Removal of bookkeeping indices.
1 byte[] iv = new byte[] {0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
2 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0}
Consider the Java statement above. After transforming into jim-
ple representation, this statement looks like the following list of
instructions.
1 $r15 = newarray (byte)[8]
2 $r15[0] = 0
3 $r15[1] = 0
4 $r15[2] = 0
5 $r15[3] = 0
6 $r15[4] = 0
7 $r15[5] = 0
8 $r15[6] = 0
9
10 $r2 = $r15
The hard coded size and the indices of an array can be regarded
as pseudo-influences. To address this false positives, we discard all
the constants that influences an array index. Also, any constant that
influences the size or the index parameter of a collection can also be
regarded as pseudo-influences. We regard List, Set as collections.
RI-IV: Removal of contextually incompatible constants.
Clipping of orthogonal invocations that doesn’t appear in an as-
sign statement can also cause false positives. To reduce false alarms
further, we also discard some constants constants based on its type
and context. Let’s consider, a class named PBEInfo is used to store it-
eration count and salt and the analysis cannot explore PBEInfo class.
A basic use-def analysis will report 5 as a salt from the following in-
voke instruction: specialinvoke r1.<KeyHolder: void
<init>(Integer, String)>(5, "5341453"). However,
a standalone Boolean or Integer constant is unlikely to be used as a
key, IV or salt, since their corresponding APIs only allow byte arrays.
Also, any hard-coded size parameter (e.g., number of iterations in
PBE (Rule 13), key size for insecure asymmetric crypto (Rule 15)) is
unlikely to have any type other than Integer. Therefore, it is possible
to discard some of the pseudo-influences by considering the types of
a constant based on its context.
RI-V: Removal of constants in infeasible paths.
Some constant initializations are overwritten along the path to the
point of interest. Counting such constants with infeasible influences
will result in false positives. Since, empty strings and nulls are
used for initialization purpose and most often, these initialization
are replaced with other values. To avoid false positive for this case,
depending on rules and the slicing criteria we discard null and
empty strings. For example, SecretKeySpec prohibits keys to be
null or empty. IvParameterSpec does not allow null as IV.
Also, PBEParameterSpec does not allow the salt to be null.
10.2 Other Evaluation Results
Figure 7: Test cases per Rule in CRYPTOAPI-BENCH.
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Table 6: The number of alerts in Apache (total 94 root-subprojects) and Android applications (6,181). For Rules 1, 2, 3, 8, 10, 12, each
constant/predictable value of an array/collection is considered as an individual violation.
Rules Apache Android# of Root-subprojects # of Alerts Per Rule # of Applications #of Alerts Per Rule
(1,2) Predictable Keys 37 (39.36%) 264 1,617 (26.16%) 12,457
(3) Hardcoded Store Password 29 (30.85%) 148 218 (3.52%) 458
(4) Dummy Hostname Verifier 8 (8.51%) 12 800 (12.94%) 1,155
(5) Dummy Cert. Validation 11 (11.70%) 30 1,564 (25.30%) 3,856
(6) Used Improper Socket 4 (4.25%) 4 210 (3.39%) 271
(7) Used HTTP 24 (29.62%) 222 2,486 (40.22%) 8,321
(8) Predictable Seeds 0 (0%) 0 80 (1.29%) 544
(9) Untrusted PRNG 33 (35.10%) 142 5,194 (84.03%) 36,223
(10) Static Salts 21 (22.34%) 112 199 (3.21%) 1,757
(11) ECB mode for Symm. Crypto 16 (17.02 %) 41 882 (14.26%) 1,780
(12) Static IVs 4 (4.25 %) 41 913 (14.77%) 12,089
(13) <1000 PBE Iterations 25 (26.59 %) 43 151 (2.44%) 312
(14) Broken Symm. Crypto Algorithms 29 (30.85 %) 86 701 (11.34%) 1,742
(15) Insecure Asymm. Crypto 9 (10.98 %) 12 108 (1.74%) 111
(16) Broken Hash 42 (44.68 %) 138 5,272 (85.29%) 49,769
Table 7: Benchmark comparison of CrySL, Coverity, SpotBugs, and CryptoGuard on all 16 rules with CRYPTOAPI-BENCH’s 112 test
cases. There are 16 secure API use cases (13 in basic and 3 in advanced), which a tool should not raise any alerts on. CRYPTOGUARD
successfully passed these 16 test cases. GTP stands for ground truth positive, which is the number of positives in the benchmark.
CRYPTOGUARD has 11 false negatives, which we reported in Section 6 and discussed in Section 7.
No. Rules GTP CrySL Coverity SpotBugs CryptoGuard
TP FP TP FP TP FP TP FP
1 Predictable Cryptographic Key 5 0 4 3 0 2 0 5 0
2 Predictable Password for PBE 6 0 2 5 0 3 0 6 0
3 Predictable Password for KeyStore 5 0 5 3 0 2 0 5 0
4 Dummy Hostname Verifier 1 – – 1 0 1 0 1 0
5 Dummy Cert. Validation 1 – – 1 0 1 0 1 0
6 Used Improper Socket 4 – – 4 0 – – 4 0
7 Use of HTTP 4 – – – – – – 4 0
8 Predictable Seed 10 – – 1 0 – – 5 0
9 Untrusted PRNG 1 – – – – 1 0 1 0
10 Static Salt 5 5 1 – – – – 3 0
11 ECB in Symm. Crypto 4 2 1 1 0 1 1 4 0
12 Static IV 6 0 6 – – 6 0 4 0
13 <1000 PBE Iteration 5 2 1 – – – – 4 0
14 Broken Symm. Crypto 20 10 5 4 0 5 5 20 0
15 Insecure Asymm. Crypto 3 2 1 – – 0 1 2 0
16 Broken Hash 16 8 4 4 0 4 4 16 0
Total 96 29 30 27 0 26 11 85 0
Table 8: Rules that use intra-procedural backward program slicing to slice implemented methods of standard Java APIs and their
corresponding slicing criteria.
No. Method to Slice Rule Criterion
4.1 javax.net.ssl.HostnameVerifier: boolean verify(String,SSLSession) 4 return
5.1 void checkServerTrusted(X509Certificate[],String) 5 checkValidity()
5.2 void checkServerTrusted(X509Certificate[],String) 5 throw
5.3 java.security.cert.X509Certificate[] getAcceptedIssuers() 5 return
Table 9: Java APIs used as slicing criteria in our intra-procedural forward program slicing and their corresponding security rules.
No. Slicing Criterion for Intra Procedural Forward Program Slicing Rule Semantic
6.1 javax.net.ssl.SSLSocketFactory: SocketFactory getDefault() 6 Create SocketFactory
6.2 javax.net.ssl.SSLContext: SSLSocketFactory getSocketFactory() 6 Create SocketFactory
15.1 java.security.KeyPairGenerator: KeyPairGenerator getInstance(java.lang.String) 15 Create KeyPairGenerator
15.2 java.security.KeyPairGenerator: KeyPairGenerator getInstance(String,String)> 15 Create KeyPairGenerator
15.3 java.security.KeyPairGenerator: KeyPairGenerator getInstance(String,Provider) 15 Create KeyPairGenerator
, ,
Table 10: Java APIs used as slicing criteria in our inter-procedural backward slicing and their corresponding security rules. Boldface
indicates the parameter of interest.
No. API Rule Semantic
1.1 javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec: void <init>(byte[],String) 1 Set key
1.2 javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec: void <init>(byte[],int,int,String) 1 Set key
2.1 javax.crypto.spec.PBEKeySpec: void <init>(char[]) 2 Set password
2.2 javax.crypto.spec.PBEKeySpec: void <init>(char[],byte[],int,int) 2 Set password
2.3 javax.crypto.spec.PBEKeySpec: void <init>(char[],byte[],int) 2 Set password
3.1 java.security.KeyStore: void load(InputStream,char[]) 3 Set password
3.2 java.security.KeyStore: void store(OutputStream,char[]) 3 Set password
3.3 java.security.KeyStore: void setKeyEntry(String,Key,char[],Certificate[]) 3 Set password
3.4 java.security.KeyStore: Key getKey(String,char[]) 3 Set password
7.1 java.net.URL: void <init>(String) 7 Set URL
7.2 java.net.URL: void <init>(String,String,String) 7 Set URL
7.3 java.net.URL: void <init>(String,String,int,String) 7 Set URL
7.4 okhttp3.Request$Builder: Request$Builder url(String) 7 Set URL
7.5 retrofit2.Retrofit$Builder: Retrofit$Builder baseUrl(String) 7 Set URL
8.1 java.security.SecureRandom: void <init>(byte[]) 8 Set seed
8.2 java.security.SecureRandom: void setSeed(byte[]) 8 Set seed
8.3 java.security.SecureRandom: void setSeed(long) 8 Set seed
10.1 javax.crypto.spec.PBEParameterSpec: void <init>(byte[],int) 10 Set salt
10.2 javax.crypto.spec.PBEParameterSpec: void <init>(byte[],int,AlgorithmParameterSpec) 10 Set salt
10.3 javax.crypto.spec.PBEKeySpec: void <init>(char[],byte[],int,int) 10 Set salt
10.4 javax.crypto.spec.PBEKeySpec: void <init>(char[],byte[],int) 10 Set salt
11.1 javax.crypto.Cipher: Cipher getInstance(String) 11, 14 Select cipher
11.2 javax.crypto.Cipher: Cipher getInstance(String, String) 11, 14 Select cipher
11.3 javax.crypto.Cipher: Cipher getInstance(String, Provider) 11, 14 Select cipher
12.1 javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec: void <init>(byte[]) 12 Set IV
12.2 javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec: void <init>(byte[],int,int) 12 Set IV
13.1 javax.crypto.spec.PBEParameterSpec: void <init>(byte[],int) 13 Set iterations
13.2 javax.crypto.spec.PBEParameterSpec: void <init>(byte[],int,AlgorithmParameterSpec) 13 Set iterations
13.3 javax.crypto.spec.PBEKeySpec: void <init>(char[],byte[],int,int) 13 Set iterations
13.4 javax.crypto.spec.PBEKeySpec: void <init>(char[],byte[],int) 13 Set iterations
15.1 java.security.KeyPairGenerator: KeyPairGenerator getInstance(String) 15 Select generator
15.2 java.security.KeyPairGenerator: KeyPairGenerator getInstance(String,String)> 15 Select generator
15.3 java.security.KeyPairGenerator: KeyPairGenerator getInstance(String,Provider) 15 Select generator
15.4 java.security.KeyPairGenerator: void initialize(int) 15 Set key size
15.5 java.security.KeyPairGenerator: void initialize(int,java.security.SecureRandom) 15 Set key size
15.6 java.security.KeyPairGenerator: void initialize(AlgorithmParameterSpec) 15 Set key size
15.7 java.security.KeyPairGenerator: void initialize(AlgorithmParameterSpec,SecureRandom) 15 Set key size
16.1 java.security.MessageDigest: MessageDigest getInstance(String) 16 Select hash
16.2 java.security.MessageDigest: MessageDigest getInstance(String, String) 16 Select hash
16.3 java.security.MessageDigest: MessageDigest getInstance(String, Provider) 16 Select hash
Figure 8: Test cases per API in CRYPTOAPI-BENCH. A test case
can cover one ore more APIs (e.g., test cases for Rule 15). APIs
corresponding to the labels can be found in Tables 10, 8, and 9.
